Water Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 41

1-1-2012

Berman v. Yarbrough, 267 P.3d 905 (Utah 2011)
Jacob A. Watterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Jacob A. Watterson, Court Report, Berman v. Yarbrough, 267 P.3d 905 (Utah 2011), 15 U. Denv. Water L.
Rev. 561 (2012).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

561

read, "a right for which a certificate has been issued pursuant to N.R.S.
533.425." Therefore, under the clarified law, a groundwater right for
which a certificate of beneficial use has been issued is still subject to the
State's forfeiture proceedings. The legislative amendments clarified that
the statute's forfeiture provision applied to groundwater rights that had
already been issued a certificate of beneficial use (a certificated right),
instead of those rights merely held under a permit (a permitted right).
Notably, permitted rights could be lost by cancellation under separate
statute. In enacting these amendments, the Legislature stated that it intended to "clarify rather than change" the statute's application. Because
the Legislature was clear that it was "clarifying" the law, the Court held
that the amended statute has retroactive effect.
Under a separate statute (N.R.S. 533.380), the State Engineer has the
express power to grant a permit holder up to ten consecutive years to put
groundwater rights to beneficial use before effecting a forfeiture of those
rights. Without the clarification regarding certificated rights, the five-year
provision in the amended statute would have been in direct conflict with
this provision.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that Jackrabbit failed to put its
groundwater to beneficial use for five years, its permit remained in good
standing. Because the Legislature clarified that a permitted right was not
subject to the same forfeiture proceedings as a certificated right, Jackrabbit's permit had not been forfeited and Jackrabbit was entitled to apply to
amend its groundwater permit.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of the
Tribe's challenge.
Elisabeth Hutchinson

UTAH
Berman v. Yarbrough, 267 P.3d 905 (Utah 2011) (holding that a Motion to Enforce an adjudicated water right must be based on a court order
directing a party to perform a specific act, and cannot be used to address
matters beyond the scope of the underlying judgment).
Daniel L. Berman owned water rights in both Utah and Wyoming
that he used to support his property in Wyoming. The Smith Fork River
supplied these water rights, which entitled Berman to divert and store
water in China Lake, located in Utah. Until 2002, Wyoming water officials had recognized Berman's Utah water rights for 131 acre-feet under a
1901 priority and 87 acre-feet under a 1935 priority. In 2002, after determining that Berman's 1901 water right was not properly documented,
these same officials requested that Berman file a secondary permit in
Wyoming to record his Utah water rights. Berman did not comply, and
then Wyoming water officials began only providing the 1935 water right
to the Wyoming property.
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Berman filed suit in Utah's Third District Court against John
Yarbrough, the Wyoming Lead Hydrographer, to compel supply of the
adjudicated water to his Wyoming property. In 2007, the court issued a
Final Order recognizing both the 1901 and 1935 water rights and determining that Berman was entitled to 500 acre-feet of storage water, from
China Lake. However, the court refused to rule on the issue of compelling Wyoming officials to comply with the order and found that the court
did not have authority to dictate the conduct of Wyoming officials. Neither party appealed this decision.
In 2009, another Wyoming water official refused to supply Berman's
property with water from China Lake because the official claimed the
water was stored out of priority. Berman responded by filing a Motion to
Enforce, asking the court to order Yarbrough and other Wyoming water
officials to comply with the district court's Final Order and supply his
Wyoming property with the adjudicated Utah water. In 2010, the district
court issued an order denying the motion, again declaring Utah water
rights not subject to Wyoming's priorities, and denying Utah jurisdiction
to order Wyoming water officials. Berman appealed.
Berman first argued that the district court erred in denying the Motion to Enforce. The Utah State Supreme Court recognized that in this
context, a Motion to Enforce is only appropriate when a party fails to
comply with a legal obligation arising from a court order directing a party
to perform a specific act. This would require the order to be an unequivocal mandate, as a court's power to enforce a judgment is limited to
the four corners of the judgment. Absent this mandate for a party to undertake a certain action, a Motion to Enforce is procedurally improper.
The court denied Berman's Motion to Enforce because it was based on
the Final Order, which did not contain an unequivocal mandate, and because the Motion attempted to compel other Wyoming officials who were
not party to the initial suit.
Berman also argued that the Motion to Enforce was really a petition
for injunctive relief. While the court recognized that a petition for injunctive relief based on a declaratory judgment was a valid pleading, it
held that Berman's motion failed to meet the requirements of a petition.
Petitions for injunctive relief must be styled as a petition, require the
identification of a standard for issuing injunctions, and be based on an
underlying judgment that contains an unequivocal mandate for a party to
undertake a certain action. Berman's motion failed to satisfy any of these
requirements.
The court concluded that the Final Order only quantified Berman's
Utah water rights and did not direct any Wyoming officer to undertake
any action. For this reason, the Motion to Enforce was procedurally improper as an attempt to short-circuit the usual adjudicative process. The
court also refused to construe the motion as a petition for injunctive relief
as it failed to meet the requirements of a valid petition.
Jacob A. Watterson

